Closing the Drain: Interest Groups and the Populist President by Cole, N. Scott
International Social Science Review 
Volume 96 Issue 1 Article 1 
Closing the Drain: Interest Groups and the Populist President 
N. Scott Cole 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr 
 Part of the Communication Commons, Economics Commons, Political Science Commons, and the 
Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cole, N. Scott () "Closing the Drain: Interest Groups and the Populist President," International Social 
Science Review: Vol. 96 : Iss. 1 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol96/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Social Science Review by an authorized editor of Nighthawks Open 
Institutional Repository. 
Closing the Drain: Interest Groups and the Populist President 
Cover Page Footnote 
N. Scott Cole is a professor of political science at Longwood University in Farmville, Virginia. 
This article is available in International Social Science Review: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol96/
iss1/1 
 
Closing the Drain: Interest Groups and the Populist President  
 
 During the 2016 American presidential campaign, Republican Party candidate Donald 
Trump said he would “drain the swamp” if elected.  “We’re going to end government corruption 
and we’re going to drain the swamp in Washington, D.C.,”1 he told supporters at a rally in 
Colorado.  When speaking about the “swamp,” Trump was partly referring to the relationships 
between interest groups and politicians, which he argued are detrimental to America.  An interest 
group uses direct lobbying and campaign donations, among other tools, to advance the shared 
policy objectives of its membership.  During the election, he warned that if the Democratic 
nominee, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton were elected, “special interests will remain 
firmly in control.”2  Trump had earlier made similar remarks about former Governor of Florida 
Jeb Bush while vying against him for the Republican nomination.3  This is not new rhetoric. 
Populists frequently contend that their opponents are beholden to powerful “insider” forces.   
In a television interview, Trump criticized political action committees (PACs) that were 
sponsoring ads attacking him, saying that they controlled his rivals with their campaign 
contributions.  He also condemned interest groups that were promoting the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), arguing that TPP “is another disaster done and pushed by special interests 
who want to rape our country, just a continuing rape of our country.”4  Trump singled out the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce for criticism in this case.  He said that it was “totally controlled by 
the special interest groups.”5    
Once in the White House, President Trump introduced few policies aimed at regulating 
lobbyists, those powerful representatives of special interest groups in Washington.  He issued an 
order restricting his appointees from lobbying their agencies within five years after leaving 
government service.  He also banned them from working with and for foreign governments for 
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life.6  While these steps were implemented, there is no record of Trump asking Congress to stop 
its members and staffers from seeking employment with interest groups after leaving Capitol 
Hill, which he promised to do on the campaign trail.  Moreover, no legislation has been 
submitted to clarify who needs to comply with the Lobbying Disclosure Act, another 
commitment he made during 2016.  During the election, President Trump pledged to prevent 
registered foreign lobbyists from raising money during campaigns, but nothing has come to 
fruition on this subject.  In addition, the Trump administration hired approximately one hundred 
former lobbyists to supervise their one-time employers.  As one New York Times reporter noted, 
“If draining the swamp means less lobbying, that isn’t happening.  Since Election Day, the 
number of new lobbyist registrations is up compared with a year ago.”7  
It is evident that President Trump has failed to fulfill or even attempted to fulfill his 
commitment to weaken the influence of interest groups.  During the election, he was meeting 
with “industry leaders, including a veteran lobbyist and the chief executive of a major airline 
trade organization,”8 the hypocrisy of which frequently got lost in the circus-like news coverage 
the election race inspired.  Furthermore, President-elect Trump received millions of dollars from 
corporations to fund his inaugural.  “Raising nearly twice as much as Barack Obama’s 2009 
record of $53 million, Donald Trump pulled in inaugural funds from, among others, corporations 
and wealthy individuals.”9  These activities are now under judicial scrutiny in Washington DC, 
where prosecutors allege that the Trump International Hotel reaped huge profits from grossly 
inflated fees it charged the Presidential Inaugural Committee to rent event space during his 
swearing-in ceremony.10  According to The Atlantic, “There is not a campaign promise that 
Donald Trump has failed to honor more flagrantly than his oft repeated pledge to ‘drain the 
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swamp’ in Washington, D.C.  He has violated the letter of his promise and trampled all over its 
spirit.”11   
During his presidency, lobbyists have connected with members of Trump’s cabinet on 
numerous occasions.  In 2017, for example, Energy Secretary Rick Perry met with one of the 
most important coal executives in the United States, Robert Murray.  At this confab, Murray 
presented Secretary Perry with a memo outlining his industry’s political objectives.  After 
reading the document, Perry replied, “‘I think we can help you with this.’”12  Making good on 
this promise, the Department of Energy later proposed regulatory changes that allowed power 
plants to increase coal stockpiles.  In October 2017, furthermore, The Washington Post reported 
that three of Trump’s cabinet secretaries—Wilbur Ross, Alexander Acosta, and Rick Perry—
attended a meeting of the National Mining Association (NMA), an organization that represents 
resource extraction companies.13   
The president himself has conferred in private with interest groups at the White House.  
After meeting with the NRA in the wake of a school shooting, Trump “abandoned his promise to 
work for gun control measures opposed by the National Rifle Association, bowing to the gun 
group and embracing its agenda of armed teachers and incremental improvements to the 
background check system.”14  He has also sat down with credit union lobbyists to discuss 
banking regulations.15  In addition, one of the president’s fundraisers, who coordinated his 
activities with representatives from the United Arab Emirates, met with Trump in a bid to have 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson fired for refusing to back UAE efforts to weaken Qatar.16  
Energy executives have also visited the president to discuss public policy.17   
Interest groups are taking additional steps to impact Trump’s decisions, such as hosting 
conferences at his properties, which include hotels and resorts.  “While it’s impossible to draw a 
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direct link between where groups seeking to influence the Trump administration hold their 
events and what they received, one thing is certain: Never before in American history have such 
groups had the opportunity to hold an event at a property owned by the president, paying for 
event space, rooms and food with money that ultimately heads into the president’s pockets.”18  
The NMA experimented with this lobbying tactic in 2017 when it sponsored a conference at 
Trump’s hotel in Washington, DC.     
Why has Trump allowed interactions between his administration and interest groups to 
flourish after promising to stop them?  To answer this question, this article examines his 
relationship with the coal industry.  During the 2016 election, Trump frequently held rallies with 
coal miners around Appalachia.  At these events, he praised their hard work and contributions to 
America, promising to save their jobs and communities.  Coal bosses also appeared at these 
assemblies and applauded his proposals.  Since Trump made the energy sector a central part of 
his campaign, it is useful to focus on his interactions with King Coal when trying to understand 
why a populist leader would foster relationships with interest groups while at the same time 
promising to dismantle them.  In the United States, the coal industry is frequently referred to as 
“King Coal” to denote its immense political and economic influence.  For this study, Trump’s 
dealings with coal bosses provide valuable material for an examination of his behavior.     
While presidents may want to keep lobbyists around for a variety of reasons, Trump’s 
actions highlight a unique factor to consider.  Specifically, this study contends that his populist 
style requires a political context where he can connect with the “common man,” foster a crisis, 
and display nationalism.  While not every interest group helps him construct the populist 
environment he needs, King Coal does, which helps explain why Trump has coordinated his 
activities with this influential organization.  First, in terms of building relationships with the 
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“common man,” the coal industry provides the president access to miners, who symbolize the 
hard-working spirit of America.  Spending time in mining communities helps Trump establish 
the belief that he is a legitimate representative of “real Americans.”  Second, in the twenty-first 
century, coal country has faced significant problems, such as rising unemployment and drug 
addiction, partly due to the coal sector’s declining fortunes.  Exploiting the challenges facing 
miners today, the president can construct a crisis narrative in order to stoke economic fear in 
other parts of America.  Third, working with King Coal helps Trump spotlight another feature of 
his populist style: patriotism.  The president connects his “America First” agenda with the energy 
industry’s fight against global environmentalism, a strategy that seeks to arouse nationalism 
across the United States.  Promoting this populist political context is essential for Trump as he 
seeks to gain power.   
When researching populism, authors must eventually confront the problems associated 
with defining such a slippery concept.  According to John Judis, “When political scientists write 
about populism, they often begin by trying to define it, as if it were a scientific term like entropy 
or photosynthesis.  That’s a mistake.”19  Even though populism can be “elusive and protean,” as 
Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner put it,20 scholars have attempted to provide some clarity.  
Alistair Hennessy, for instance, says that populism represents the mobilization of politically 
unaffiliated industrial workers, at least in the case of Latin America.21  Richard Hofstadter also 
pursues an economic perspective in his definition, arguing that these types of movements are 
driven by the financial anxieties of “entrepreneurial radicals.”22  While the Jacksonian variety 
also includes economic empowerment, it adds anti-elitism and the political mobilization of the 
“common man.”      
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For other scholars, social ethics are an essential ingredient to consider.  For example, 
Donald MacRae says populism is an ideology that worships the sacred values of rural 
communities.23  In Cas Mudde and Cristobal Kaltwasser’s conceptualization, populism is a “thin-
centered ideology” that pits the will of the “pure people” against the “corrupt elite.”24  Most 
definitions, regardless of their focal points, highlight the tensions that exist between elites and 
non-elites.  Essentially, the “people” are always portrayed as virtuous soldiers engaged in a 
struggle against politicians, financiers, or “foreigners.”25   
While these viewpoints contribute to our understanding, the present study favors the 
strategic perspective.  This definition contends that populism is a political algorithm used by 
elites to gain power.  This “approach emphasizes . . . the emergence of a strong and charismatic 
figure, who concentrates power and maintains a direct connection with the masses.”26  In 
Trump’s case, his brand of populism is based on building relationships with social actors that 
help him win elections.  While other populists might display different characteristics, Trump’s 
politics follow a vote-maximizing logic.  This definition adds a rational-choice dimension to the 
populist persona.  As Anthony Downs states, “every government seeks to maximize political 
support.  We further assume that the government exists in a democratic society where periodic 
elections are held, that its primary goal is reelection, and that election is the goal of those parties 
now out of power.”27  Trump’s collaboration with King Coal follows Downs’ prediction that 
politicians will pursue alliances that help them win office.      
Trump uses the slogan “drain the swamp” in a variety of ways.  This phrase is deployed 
to demonstrate how he promotes government deregulation, fights political corruption, resists the 
“deep state,” and challenges “establishment” politicians.  However, this study utilizes James 
Strock’s definition to understand what is meant by the “swamp”: “Draining the swamp, or 
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transforming the culture in Washington, means deconstructing the Special Interest State.”28  
Before examining why Trump’s siphoning efforts have lagged, the next section focuses on 
scholarly interpretations of interest group-executive branch relations.  It concludes by 
highlighting areas that need clarification when it comes to explaining how and why populist 
presidents interact with organized interests.         
Interest Group Politics and the White House 
Trump is not alone when it comes to criticizing interest groups.  In addition to thousands 
of politicians, many academics have also disparaged these political actors.  In The Semisovereign 
People, for instance, E.E. Schattschneider shows that the most powerful groups in Washington 
are funded by corporations.  Countering those who heap praise on these organizations—that is, 
the pluralists29—he contends that the “flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus 
sings with a strong upper-class accent.”30  In his study, Michael Parenti identifies how corporate 
lobbyists co-opt government officials in order to obtain favorable treatment.31  William Hudson 
reinforces these interpretations, saying that, “people who control large business corporations 
dominate our political processes and largely control the public policy outcomes.”32  In 
Demosclerosis, Jonathan Rauch supports these findings by identifying how pressure groups clog 
the arteries of government.33 
As they seek to explain interest group-executive branch relations, scholars usually discuss 
access to the White House.  While it is typical to hear stories about lobbyists working with 
Congress, they also have a long history of contacting presidents.  Only during the modern 
presidency, however, have these interactions intensified and become more structured.  As Joseph 
Pika notes, Franklin Roosevelt assigned the task of organizing meetings with pressure groups to 
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his closest aides.34  Later in the century, the White House created the Office of Public Liaison 
(OPL) to manage negotiations with organized interests.35   
In their research, Kay Schlozman and John Tierney identify different access channels 
used by groups seeking the president’s attention, such as White House staff and presidential 
advisory boards.36  Adding to this list, Jeffrey Berry notes that lobbyists build connections with 
bureaucrats in order to participate in the executive branch’s policymaking process.37  Neil Cole 
also highlights different paths that groups pursue as they attempt to build relationships with the 
Oval Office.  For example, they exploit the organizational structures of the institutional 
presidency, what he calls the “formal” conduits, such as the Cabinet.  Or they utilize access 
points that exist outside established institutions, such as family and friends of the president.38  
AT&T’s hiring of Trump’s one-time personal attorney, Michael Cohen, fits this “informal” 
category.  According to Heath Brown, furthermore, lobbyists attempt to contact new presidents 
even before they take office, using presidential transitions as “their first opportunity to curry 
favor and seek influence with the newly elected administration.”39            
Political scientists have also studied different factors that encourage interest group-
presidency collaboration.  In his study, Pika notes how the decline of political parties since the 
1960s has contributed to increasing interactions between lobbyists and the Oval Office.40  Martha 
Kumar and Michael Grossman support this thesis, saying that in recent years, presidents have 
used lobbyists to get messages to Congress and the public, rather than relying on parties.41  
Moreover, scholars recognize that chief executives seek alliances with these organizations in 
order to gain electoral and governing benefits.  For instance, presidents ask pressure groups to 
mobilize their members during campaigns and elections.  The White House also urges groups to 
call or write letters to elected representatives on behalf of the president’s agenda.  As Thomas 
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Holyoke highlights, furthermore, the executive branch outsources “work to interest groups and 
private companies,” which acts as an incentive for lobbyists to maintain contact with the Oval 
Office.42      
When it comes to group influence, another topic of conversation, some scholars say that 
lobbyists control the president.  According to Benjamin Ginsberg, Walter Mebane, and Martin 
Shefter, “Elites have been able to secure power without building a strong popular base by 
fashioning institutional bastions for themselves in government agencies.”43  For example, liberal 
groups have placed lobbyists in the regulatory state to defend ideological priorities, and 
Republican-affiliated organizations have entrenched themselves in the national security 
apparatus for the same purpose.  This structural feature prevents presidents from successfully 
implementing their agendas.  With a case study of the Cuban American National Foundation 
(CANF), Patrick Haney and Walt Vanderbush also support the notion that interest groups 
influence presidential decisions.  During the Reagan presidency, the CANF frequently proposed 
items for his administration to consider, and they even implemented the White House’s policies 
related to Cuba.44  In The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, John Mearsheimer and Stephen 
Walt identify how Jewish groups have impacted America’s national security strategies.45  
Regarding domestic policy, Simon Haeder and Susan Yackee contend that groups use the Office 
of Management and Budget’s regulatory review process “as a point of entry for lobbying and, 
under certain circumstances, are able to influence public policy outputs.”46  
Not all scholars agree that interest groups have power over the Oval Office.  Specifically, 
Jeffrey Berry and Kent Portney maintain that presidents can restrict lobbyists’ access to 
government agencies, which curbs their influence.  This happened when Vice President Dan 
Quayle supervised the Council on Competitiveness.47  As Holyoke argues, “the president and his 
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immediate staff often keep interest groups at arm’s length.  Instead of being able to acquire face 
time with senior administrative staff to press their own cases, lobbyists are largely granted access 
only when they are needed to build support for the president’s policy agenda in Congress or with 
the public.”48  From another perspective, Mark Peterson discusses how President Reagan was 
able to weaken liberal organizations by cutting programs that benefited them.49   
While these arguments are important to consider, one issue has not received much 
attention in the literature: how populist politicians interact with organized interests.  Existing 
studies usually focus on non-populist chief executives.  Graham Wilson, however, does 
recognize that the “styles” of individual presidents can shape their alliances with lobbyists;50 but 
his research does not delve into populism.  More analysis is needed when it comes to this 
subject.  For instance, the access channels used to contact populist presidents must be identified.  
Also, whether lobbyists can influence these types of leaders is a subject that demands attention.   
Another vital question to consider is why a populist would want to work with interest 
groups.  For this brand of politician, aligning with pressure groups is supposedly forbidden.  
These organizations represent the “enemies” of the “people.”  They created the “mess” that 
needs to be cleaned up.  As the following parts of this article demonstrate, however, Trump has 
not followed this dictum.  This is an important finding not only because it highlights an essential 
feature of his brand of populism, but it also adds to our knowledge of how interest groups 
navigate a populist environment that is founded on hostility to their existence.  According to this 
study, lobbyists have nothing to fear from Trump as long as they help satisfy his political needs.  
To explore this aspect of his presidency, the next section focuses on what motivates his 
relationship with King Coal.  
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The Political Needs of a Populist President  
 When academics and other commentators write about President Trump, they often 
mention his populist tendencies.51  As J. Eric Oliver and Wendy Rahn state, “Exploiting a large 
‘representation gap,’ Donald Trump has enjoyed a ripe opportunity to make a strong populist 
claim to the presidency.  Trump capitalized on this by employing a rhetoric that is distinctive in 
its simplicity, anti-elitism, and high degree of collectivist language.”52  In The New American 
Revolution, Kayleigh McEnany writes, “As President Donald Trump continues on the journey of 
his first term, I know he does so with an eye for the people, not the politicians.”53  On the 
campaign trail, candidate Trump frequently displayed his populist streak when he said that he 
loved the “poorly educated” and that he represented the “silent majority.”   
While some question his populist credentials, especially considering his wealthy 
upbringing,54 Trump has consistently promoted this image of himself.  For this study, the 
president’s leadership style is important to contemplate as it attempts to explain his relationship 
with interest groups, especially the coal lobby.  This research maintains that he has formed an 
alliance with King Coal in order to construct an environment that makes populism a viable 
political strategy.  As a result of their interactions, he has been able to amplify three vital aspects 
of his preferred context.  First, the president is afforded regular opportunities to associate with 
the “common man.”  This allows him to market the notion that he is fighting for “real 
Americans” against the Washington establishment.  Second, due to this coalition, Trump is given 
the opportunity to peddle a crisis narrative.  Since the mining sector is experiencing declining 
fortunes, the president can use its troubles to build a paradigm of economic fear and then sell it 
to the American people.  Third, aligning with King Coal provides the White House with an 
opening to display patriotism.  Trump can frame the coal industry’s struggle against global 
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environmental regulations in terms of putting “America First.”  The following sections detail 
how Trump’s alignment with the coal lobby helps construct and magnify these aspects of his 
favored political milieu.     
The “Common Man’s” President 
Fareed Zakaria says that populists “share a suspicion of and hostility towards elites, 
mainstream politics, and established institutions.”55  Mudde and Kaltwasser contend that this 
concept is based on the idea of “a democratic way of life built through popular engagement in 
politics.”56  Populism represents, moreover, a “political strategy employed by a specific type of 
leader who seeks to govern based on direct and unmediated support from their followers.”57  As 
Jan-Werner Muller states, “Populists claim that they, and they alone, represent the people.”58  
Populists essentially require a direct link with the “real people.”  This allows them to maintain an 
image of political legitimacy among their working-class supporters.  For a billionaire like 
President Trump, significant resources must be dedicated to this type of activity.      
Donald Trump consistently seeks “companionship” with “real Americans,” which is 
highlighted by his interactions with coal miners.  Since they bolster his populist image, the 
president puts considerable effort into cultivating relationships with this group.  During the 2016 
campaign, he made trips to several states with significant coal operations, including 
Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia.  His Twitter account featured pictures of 
his meetings with miners.59  According to Trump, coal miners are the epitome of America’s 
“greatness.”  At an election rally in West Virginia, he said its residents “make America great.”60  
During another stop, he put on a miner’s hard hat to show his harmony with them.  In 
Pennsylvania, he held up a sign that said “Trump Digs Coal.”  At an event in Abingdon, 
Virginia, supporters adorned with overalls typically worn by miners provided his backdrop.  
12
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Some of them held signs saying “Friends of Coal.”  As Clifford Krauss and Michael Corkery 
state, “Donald J. Trump made coal a centerpiece of his campaign, holding rousing rallies with 
miners in hard hats, who he said had been neglected under eight years of the Obama 
administration.”61              
Throughout the election, many miners believed the billionaire candidate was their 
industry’s savior.  Declan Walsh reported that, “For these men, this season’s presidential 
campaign boils down to a single choice.  ‘I’m for Trump,’ said Dwayne Riston, 27, his face 
smeared in dust.  ‘Way I see it, if he wins, we might at least stand a chance of surviving.’”62  
These coal miners also felt that Americans were looking at them like they were dumb hillbillies.  
Trump offered a different vibe, which was transmitted when he said that, “miners should ‘get 
ready, because you are going to be working your asses off!’”63  As one voter stated after 
attending a Trump event, ‘“He’s the one that cares about us.  He’s the only one out of 
everybody—Democrat or Republican—that really cares about us.’”64 
Once in the White House, President Trump made certain to showcase his new allies.  
When he signed a bill permitting coal waste to be dumped into streams, miners surrounded him.  
He also invited them to attend another event where he announced an executive order removing 
Obama-era regulations governing the energy sector.  Singling out these workers for attention, he 
said,  
“I want to acknowledge the truly amazing people behind me on this stage:  
our incredible coal miners.  We love our coal miners.  Great people.  Over  
the past two years, I’ve spent time with the miners all over America.  They told me  
about the struggles they’ve endured.  I actually, in one case, I went to a group of  
miners in West Virginia—you remember, Shelley—and I said, how about this:  
Why don’t we get together, we’ll go to another place, and you’ll get another job;  
you won’t mine anymore.  Do you like that idea?  They said, no, we don’t like that  
idea—we love to mine, that’s what we want to do.  I said, if that’s what you want  
to do, that’s what you’re going to do.”65    
 
13
Cole: Closing the Drain: Interest Groups and the Populist President
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository,
 
These social interactions with blue-collar workers paid off during the 2016 election.  
Many coal miners, in addition to other working-class voters, showed their appreciation by 
casting ballots for Trump, helping him win West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.  Even today, 
when much of the nation has soured on his presidency, Trump’s approval rating is over 50 
percent in West Virginia and Kentucky.66  Many working-class Americans feel a connection with 
him.  His cultivation of friendship with coal miners has helped cement this aspect of his populist 
persona.  With the assistance of the coal sector, Trump has successfully constructed one aspect 
of the political environment that populists need: a connection with the “common man.”   
Crisis and Fear   
In The Shock Doctrine, Naomi Kline writes about Latin American generals who 
manipulated emergency situations to gain power in the 1970s.67  Military leaders are not alone 
when it comes to using this tactic.  Populists also display this behavior by “reintroducing conflict 
into politics and fostering the mobilization of excluded sectors of society with the aim of 
changing the status quo.”68  Moreover, “Drawing upon anti-intellectualism and a sense of 
urgency, often largely created by the populists themselves, he will argue that the situation 
(‘crisis’) requires ‘bold action’ and ‘common sense solutions.”69  For Trump, stoking anxiety 
was central to his 2016 campaign.  As Elaine May states, his “message resonated with millions 
of mostly white Americans whose fears have generated anger and resentment against strangers, 
minorities, and outsiders who, they wrongly assumed, threatened their security.”70   
To create an atmosphere of uncertainty, populists deploy crisis narratives.  This helps 
them shape and direct the public’s trepidations in order to gain influence.  For Trump, his 
speaking style adds to the power of his fear mongering.  According to Arlie Hochschild, the 
president has a rhetorical rhythm that deeply affects his core supporters.  She writes, his 
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“speeches—evoking dominance, bravado, clarity, national pride, and personal uplift—inspire an 
emotional transformation.”71  After observing one of his campaign rallies, she detected that many 
of his voters appeared to be in a “state of rapture.”72  When speaking to those who believe they 
are “strangers in their own land,” Trump has the ability to make them feel important and 
empowered.            
To construct the second leg of his preferred political environment—crisis—Trump has 
relied on rhetoric crafted by the coal industry.  He has mainly channeled the energy sector’s 
frustrations with President Obama’s environmental policies, such as the Clean Power Plan.  This 
proposal, which was never enacted due to court challenges, encouraged power plants to use 
natural gas instead of coal.  Another source of consternation for the industry was Obama’s order 
prohibiting the dumping of mining waste into streams, in addition to his support for the Paris 
Climate Agreement.  For coal executives, these policies were perceived to be an existential 
threat.  As a result, they asked judges to strike down the president’s regulations and petitioned 
members of Congress to protect their extraction activities.   
Coal operators also added a crisis narrative to support their struggle, one that employed 
the “war on coal” slogan.  Former CEO of Massey Energy Don Blankenship has been credited 
with popularizing this phrase.  Adam Raymond notes that he “was instrumental in crafting the 
bogus idea that President Obama was waging a ‘war on coal.”73  The Friends of Coal, an 
organization created by the West Virginia Coal Association, adopted this slogan and used it in 
ads attacking the president’s policies.  Robert Murray has also repeated this propaganda on 
numerous occasions.  Luke Popovich, who once worked for the NMA, took the hyperbole to a 
new level when he compared Obama’s regulations to the four horsemen of the apocalypse.74   
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The coal industry contrived additional language to describe Obama’s energy reforms.  
Bill Raney, head of the West Virginia Coal Association, said in 2013 that the “administration 
will impose bureaucratic mandates with no regard for the people and communities of West 
Virginia that depend on coal and the inexpensive energy it creates for their very existence and 
survival.”  “Make no mistake,” he continued, “this administration’s new climate initiative will 
negatively impact West Virginia coal jobs, result in higher electric bills for consumers and 
businesses and lead to America’s economic disarmament via U.S. manufacturing jobs relocating 
to other nations.”75  In a Charleston Gazette-Mail editorial, Raney framed the president’s actions 
this way: “Since taking office in January 2009, the Obama administration has relentlessly 
pursued its anti-coal, anti-business agenda, strangling the American economy with radical 
policies and rules.  Even in the best of economic times, these policies would hamstring American 
business.  Combined with the current worldwide economic challenges, the EPA’s war against 
business threatens millions of jobs and the very foundation of our economy.”76  Moreover, in 
reference to Obama’s stream rule, the NMA said it was “a win for bureaucracy and extreme 
environmental groups and a loss for everyday Americans.”77     
To help feed insecurity in America, Trump borrowed this rhetoric almost verbatim.  
Essentially, the coal industry handed the president a prefabricated set of arguments, including 
catchphrases and statistics.  Trump’s Twitter account has evidence of this appropriation.  As part 
of a message he posted in 2014, Trump argued that, “Obama’s war on coal is killing American 
jobs, making us more energy dependent on our enemies & creating a great business 
disadvantage.”78  Another tweet during that year’s midterm election said West Virginians needed 
to elect someone who would end the “war on coal.”79  On the campaign trail in 2016, candidate 
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Trump continued to use this type of language, stating in Pittsburgh that, “we will end the war on 
coal and the war on miners.”80    
Trump has employed other crisis rhetoric, which also matches King Coal’s, to describe 
the effects of Obama’s policies on miners.  At the signing ceremony mentioned in the previous 
section, he noted that his predecessor tried to destroy coal communities.  “The miners told me 
about the attacks on their jobs and their livelihoods.  They told me about the efforts to shut down 
their mines, their communities, and their very way of life.”81  He also said during the 2016 
campaign that if Hillary Clinton were to win, coal mining would be abolished.     
Using an off-the-rack crisis narrative made Trump’s political life easier.  To begin, it has 
saved him time and money, especially since coal executives did all the test marketing for the 
“war on coal” slogan before he adopted it.  Moreover, this phrase was useful in getting voters to 
the polls.  As Steve Bannon (the former head of Breitbart News and White House senior advisor 
during the first months of Trump’s presidency) once noted, “Fear is a good thing.  Fear is going 
to lead you to take action.”82  Raising anxiety levels among coal miners and working-class 
Americans certainly helped Trump win their votes, with 71 percent of white men and 61 percent 
of white women with no college degree casting ballots for him.83  From a governing perspective, 
there are advantages to promoting fear in society, too.  Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt argue 
that during an emergency, “Citizens become more likely to tolerate, and even endorse, 
authoritarian measures when they fear for their security.”84  If populists can create a sense of 
uncertainty and unease among the population, it is easier for them to achieve their political 
objectives.  Trump has most certainly used this tactic to his advantage during his presidency.      
This study recognizes that coal communities are suffering.  An Appalachian Regional 
Commission report shows that coal production declined by 45 percent between 2005 and 2015.  
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For those same years, there was a 27 percent drop in coal employment, mainly in Central 
Appalachia.  Poverty rates have also increased as good-paying occupations have failed to 
materialize to replace vanishing coal jobs.85  In addition, the opioid crisis has led to rising 
mortality rates across the region.  Therefore, coal miners are correct when portraying their 
situation in dire terms.  What this research focuses on, however, is the manner in which Trump 
has used their strife to construct his preferred political environment, one where fear is ever-
present.  Harmonizing his rhetoric with the coal lobby’s narratives has buttressed the president as 
he seeks to convince the rest of the nation that they, too, should be afraid.      
Nationalism 
 The promotion of nationalism is another characteristic of populism.  When the populist 
Hugo Chavez was in power, he consistently railed against the United States for interfering in 
Venezuela’s political process.  He felt like a victim of American “imperialism.”  In the case of 
Brexit, populists like Nigel Farage argued that the European Union (EU) eroded Britain’s 
sovereignty and its national identity.  For these types of leaders, they also link a sense of 
nationalism with a hatred of elites.  “Populists . . . often argue that the elite is not just ignoring 
the interests of the people; rather, they are even working against the interests of the country.”86  
“In the United States, a country in which some citizens are fascinated with conspiracy theories, 
many right-wing populists are convinced that elites . . . are working to establish a ‘new world 
government,’ which would put the United States under UN control.”87   
According to Jarrel de Matas, “Trump embodies an extreme liberal nationalist type; one 
who feels it necessary to reclaim something that is apparently lost.  His rhetoric is symptomatic 
of a return to the appeal of nationalism.”88  In his book Crippled America, Trump displays this 
aspect of his leadership style.  He writes, “I know how lucky I am.  The day I was born I had 
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already won the greatest lottery on Earth.  I was born in the United States of America.”89  To 
show his patriotism, Trump once installed an extremely large American flag at his Mar-a-Lago 
residence.  When people appear to be “unpatriotic,” furthermore, he criticizes them.  In the case 
of NFL players who refuse to stand for the national anthem, he demands that they be fired.  He 
uses these situations to create a sense of crisis regarding African American patriotism to maintain 
anger among his white supporters.  In addition, he has promoted the idea of having an annual 
military parade to help instill Americans with a sense of pride in their country.   
When it comes to foreign affairs, the president has many targets while showcasing his 
nationalism.  For example, Trump says globalization caused jobs losses in America’s 
manufacturing sector.  Also, he claims that countries around the world are taking advantage of 
the US by dumping their products into our markets.  To confront these practices, he removed the 
United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and initiated a renegotiation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  He also placed tariffs on numerous consumer goods 
imported from China, Mexico, Canada, and the EU.   
Working with the coal lobby helps Trump put nationalism in the spotlight.  The Paris 
Agreement, or Paris Climate Accord, is an example of how the president coordinates with the 
mining sector to construct a nationalistic narrative.  The Paris Accord, negotiated by President 
Obama, seeks to limit global temperature changes.  When Trump signed an order removing the 
US from the pact, he said that, “I can put no other consideration before the wellbeing of 
American citizens.  The Paris Climate Accord is simply the latest example of Washington 
entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other 
countries, leaving American workers—who I love—and taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of 
lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic production.”90  “I 
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was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris,” he told those gathered at the 
ceremony.91  Trump argued, furthermore, that the deal would disadvantage the US while 
allowing countries like China and India to continue polluting.  He outlined the effects this 
agreement would have on coal mining when justifying his decision, contending that foreign 
countries would be able to dig more coal than the United States under the pact, which would 
result in job losses in our mining industry.  Moreover, he said, “The Paris Agreement handicaps 
the United States economy in order to win praise from the very foreign capitals and global 
activists that have long sought to gain wealth at our country’s expense.  They don’t put America 
first.  I do, and I always will.”92   
When it comes to coal executives, they are in sync with the president.  They also want to 
put “America first,” and the Paris Climate Accord is a good example of their alignment with the 
White House.  Specifically, most of the coal operators in the United States view this agreement 
as a threat to their profits.  Even though a few members of the National Mining Association 
sought a compromise that would have allowed the US to remain in the pact, Murray Energy and 
nineteen others voted at an NMA gathering to encourage Trump to leave it.93  The West Virginia 
Coal Association called the accord “just another nail in the coffin” of the power industry.94     
Some in the coal sector have framed their objections to the plan in nationalistic terms.  
Popovich said, for instance, that the agreement would allow other countries to cheat and the US 
would be “the only ‘good kid in the class.”95  When the Kentucky Coal Association’s Tyler 
White thanked Trump for his decision, he stated that this move put “America first” and would 
help the country achieve “energy dominance.”96  Once referred to as “energy independence,” 
White’s statement used Trump’s preferred phrase: “energy dominance.”  For the president, 
America needs to liberate itself from foreign energy suppliers that might be able to hold the US 
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“hostage.”  He has identified OPEC as a global organization that harms America’s sovereignty.  
Extracting more coal is part of his plan to make the US energy dominant and less dependent on 
foreigners, which explains why King Coal is on board with the president’s policies.           
Trump and several coal bosses also agree when it comes to global warming.  Many 
within the coal industry, such as Murray Energy and Peabody Energy, have denied that climate 
change is real, and President Trump has echoed this sentiment numerous times.  Trump even 
adds a nationalistic angle when discussing this topic.  He argues that foreign governments, 
especially China, have created a global warming “hoax” in order to weaken the United States.  
The Chinese, he claims, want US manufacturing to be less competitive in order to make their 
own products more attractive on the international market.       
Trump’s displays of nationalism have served him well among his supporters.  Many blue-
collar workers who have been displaced by job losses in recent decades point the finger at 
globalization.  For them, it is time to put America first instead of sending US jobs to other 
countries.  Aligning with the coal industry against the forces of cosmopolitanism has helped 
Trump convince many voters that he is a true patriot.  This constitutes a third feature of the 
political environment that he relies on to build power.        
Accessing and Influencing a Populist President 
 According to the needs-based model of interest group-presidency collaboration, which 
dovetails with the framework used in this study, lobbyists need presidents and presidents need 
lobbyists.  A quid pro quo mentality motivates their interactions.  For example, to run their 
departments successfully, Cabinet secretaries require information, which they often times obtain 
from lobbyists.  In return for providing data and research, interest groups get assistance with 
understanding and implementing agency regulations.  While this is a useful model to study, one 
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presidential prerequisite is missing when it comes to explaining why populist leaders want to 
work with pressure groups.  Since populism emerges during unique periods in history, usually 
those experiencing social and economic upheaval, populist politicians need to sustain those 
conditions that enabled their rise to power, hoping this will help them remain politically relevant.  
To accomplish this feat, they require the assistance of different actors in the political system.  
Trump has used Cabinet officials, White House staff, and others to construct the necessary 
context required for his populist politics.  Moreover, as this research shows, he has synchronized 
his actions with interest groups in order to build and maintain his favored environment.  
Therefore, the socially constructed political setting is a necessity that should be added to the list 
of presidential needs when examining interest group-presidency relations, at least when talking 
about populist presidents.          
 Populist and non-populist presidents share a common set of aspirations: they want to win 
office and govern successfully.  Both types of politicians reach out to interest groups to satisfy 
these needs.  Populist leaders—at least in the case of Trump—use pressure groups to help build a 
specific context that enables them to achieve electoral and governing victories.  For Trump, he 
requires contact with the “common man,” opportunities to foster a crisis, and chances to display 
nationalism.  King Coal assists in the construction of this environment, which is why he has not 
“drained the swamp.”  While non-populists most certainly encounter the “common man,” foster 
crises, and show nationalism from time to time, they do not require these ingredients in order to 
win office or to govern effectively.  For Trump and populists like him, these elements are vital.   
A populist leader will not necessarily avoid an organization that is unable to assist in the 
construction of his or her political stage.  In the case of Trump, he has established ties with a 
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wide variety of interest groups, including those that are not in the business of creating crisis 
events, displaying nationalism, or providing opportunities to connect with the “common man.” 
A significant part of this research has focused on the indirect nature of Trump’s alliance 
with the coal lobby, such as the coordination of his rhetoric with King Coal’s.  It has not 
explored what some consider to be the “traditional” interest group-executive branch relationship, 
that is, direct lobbying.  Trump does have this type of interaction with coal operators.  In the first 
year of his presidency, their lobbyists navigated different access channels to contact the 
president.  For example, industry executives utilized formal conduits to gain entry into the White 
House’s decision-making process, attending meetings with Trump’s Cabinet secretaries.  They 
also talked privately with the president himself.  The coal lobby, moreover, met with Trump’s 
first Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) director, Scott Pruitt, to discuss the Paris Climate 
Accord.  Moreover, the president’s current EPA head, Andrew Wheeler, is a former coal lobbyist 
himself, which places the industry in a favorable position when it comes to accessing the 
administration.  
Coal operators have also influenced the president’s policy decisions, another aspect of the 
“traditional” interest group-presidency relationship.  The removal of America from the Paris 
Accord, the dismantling of the Clean Power Plan, and the repeal of Obama’s stream rule were all 
implemented by the president after lobbying by coal executives.  Furthermore, the industry was 
given a boost when the president opened public lands to mining.  Currently, the Mine Safety and 
Health Administration (MSHA) is moving to relax rules that restrict the amount of dust miners 
are exposed to on the job, which coal operators favor.  During his time at the EPA, Pruitt sought 
to alter regulations associated with the storage of coal ash, another policy promoted by King 
Coal.   
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Contrary to what might have been expected, especially considering Trump’s “drain-the-
swamp” rhetoric, pressure groups have not been checked by his administration.  Lobbyists have 
not been kept out of the White House, and they have received much of what they wanted 
legislatively, at least in the case of King Coal.  As long as they help construct and maintain 
Trump’s preferred populist context, organized interests have nothing to fear from his presidency.    
Based on the model presented in this study, political observers should expect fresh 
“swamp” activity if Trump wins the 2020 presidential election.  Coal executives, in addition to 
other lobbyists connected with the president, can anticipate additional policy victories if he 
returns to the White House.  As for the coal miners themselves, they can look forward to 
Trump’s visits to their communities as he seeks to construct props for his populist political 
drama.  For the general public, it should brace itself for nationalistic diatribes against 
“foreigners” and “disloyal” Americans who dare challenge his vision for the country.  We should 
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